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Abstract
Using a cross-section of countries, we adapt Frankel and Romer’s (1999) IV strategy
to international labor mobility. Controlling for institutional quality, trade, and financial
openness, we establish a robust and non-negative causal effect of immigration on real per-
capita income.
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1 Motivation
Advocates of liberal policies argue that immigration raises the income of native factor owners
(Borjas, 1994). For this immigration surplus to materialize, the aggregate production function
must display complementarity between inputs and the factor-content of the immigrant inflow
must have a different composition than the pre-existing stock of natives.1 In contrast, per capita
income- including immigrants- does not necessarily go up. If immigrants are on average poorer
than natives, it trivially falls.2 Besides being of intrinsic interest, the per capita income effect
determines whether the winners of immigration can potentially compensate the losers without
excluding the immigrants from the redistribution scheme.
In the long-run, if immigrants assimilate perfectly (i.e. become indistinguishable from na-
tives) and the capital stock adjusts, per capita income reverts to the initial level. However, even
in the long-run, migrants may have different propensities to accumulate financial and human
capital than natives, which affects per capita income. Moreover, Ottaviano and Peri (2006)
argue that the diversity-enhancing effect of immigration increases the value of aggregate out-
put. Still, there may be an opposite effect, if immigration exacerbates ethnic tensions. These
ambiguities call for an empirical assessment, the first one - to our best knowledge - on a broad
number of countries.3
We deal with the endogeneity of immigration to per capita income constructing the geograph-
ical component of migration from cross-country data on bilateral migrant stocks and using it as
an instrument - akin to Frankel and Romer’s (1999, henceforth F&R) for trade openness. Based
on non-weak instruments, our analysis establishes a robust, non-negative effect of immigration
on per capita income.
1Other conditions, such as the absence of distortions must hold too.
2Total GDP always increases if immigrants find productive employment.
3Buch and Toubal (2008) account for labor market openness in their study of German states.
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2 Empirical strategy
Income regression. Following a well established literature, we estimate the following cross-
country income regression:
ln yi = α+ βM lnMi + βTTi + βFFi + γ
′Γi + ιIi + ui, (1)
where i is the country index, yi is per capita GDP (constant dollar PPP, in 2000) and Mi the
stock of immigrants. The vector Γi contains population, land surface, a continuous measure
of landlockedness - to capture domestic market size - and the malaria index - to control for
geography (Rodrik et al., 2004).4 Ii proxies institutional quality (Glaeser et. al., 2004).
Our focus is on βM . Since we include population (native and foreign-born), βM does not
measure the pure size effect of immigration but rather its compositional effect, namely the one
of an increase in the immigrant share.
A country’s attitude towards migration is likely shaped by its history and culture. Unable to use
fixed effects in a cross-section, we account for unobserved heterogeneity by inclusion of Ti - the
ratio of exports and imports over GDP - and Fi - an indicator of financial market integration.
We presume that a liberal attitude towards labour flows comes along with a high degree of
integration on goods and financial markets.
Instrumental Variables. Mi, Ti, are potentially endogenous. Following F&R, we exploit ge-
ographical variation to instrument Ti. We extend this strategy to Mi, using a 226x226 matrix of
international bilateral migrant stocks for the year 2000. Migrants are defined as “foreign-born”,
so that our measure is unaffected by national naturalization policies. Let Mij denote the number
of individuals born in country j and residing in i. Then, Mi =
∑
j∈J Mij is the total immigrant
stock.
Let
E(Xij |Gij, ADJij) = exp[GijγX +ADJijλX + (GijADJij)δX ] (2)
4The index of landlockedness is the share of land borders in total border length. Compare Sachs (2003).
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with X ∈ {M,T} . Gij is a vector containing geographical variables (landlockedness, ln pop-
ulation in 1960, ln area for each i and j and ln bilateral distance) and ADJij an adjacency
dummy.5 We use Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) to estimate (2) for the year
2000 (see Santos and Tenyreyro (2006)). Our instruments are computed as Xˆi =
∑
j Xˆij ,
Xˆij = GijγˆX +ADJij λˆX + (GijADJij)δˆX is the in-sample linear prediction.6
Three remarks are in order. First, PPML estimation yields stronger instruments compared
to OLS, since it accounts for cases with Xij = 0, representing a non-negligable share of country-
pairs (6(3)% of Mij(Tij) in the respective sample).
Second, Xˆi is a generated measure of multilateral remoteness determined exclusively by geogra-
phy. Hence, no concerns about consistency of (2) as a gravity equation arise.
Third, Mˆi and Tˆi prove to be collinear in our regression analysis, leading to weak-instruments
when used simultaneously. On the presumption a country’s remoteness affects economic and
psychological cost of migration, we shall use M˜i = 1N−1
∑
wDwi as an alternative instrument for
Mi (N is the number of countries and Dwi is bilateral distance).
Fi and Ii may well be endogenous, but simultaneous instrumentation of many endogenous
regressors exacerbates the concern for weak instruments. Since good bilateral data for financial
flows are rare, we abstain from instrumenting Fi like Xi, but rather proxy Fi by the (ln) distance
to the closest major financial center (Rose and Spiegel, 2008). Ii is constitutional review (La
Porta et. al., 2004). Compared to alternative common measures (e.g. expropriation risk or
government effectiveness), it reflects permanent constraints on the executive authority, rather
than election outcomes or temporary policies (Glaeser et al., 2004). By definition, endogeneity
concerns are attenuated.
5The specification is borrowed from F&R. Lewer and van den Berg (2008) show that bilateral migration flows
are accurately predicted by geographical variables (along with income and population).
6Using only in-sample predictions increases precision, compare Noguer (2005).
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3 Results
The elasticity of y with respect to the migrant stock is (significantly) positive throughout all
specification in Table 1. Most importantly, weakness of instruments is of no concern (see the
minimum eigenvalue statistics - Stock and Motohiro (2002)).
Effect of Immigration. (2) and (3) provide IV estimates based on Mˆ and M˜ , respectively.
The different performance in (2) relative to (3) is ascribed to the correlation of 0.52 between Mˆ
and T (and, therefore with the residual), whereas M˜ is free of this problem. Overall, OLS un-
derestimates βM . Several factors weigh upon this discrepancy. On the one hand, measurement
error in the migrant stock causes attenuation bias in OLS. On the other hand, unobserved het-
erogeneity (T, F ), would cause overestimation of OLS. Finally, the direction of the simultaneity
bias(reverse causality of M and y) is ambiguous.
Interestingly, throughout first stage regressions, M˜ is negatively correlated with immigration,
but positively associated with trade openness.
Trade Openness. In (5), we add trade openess. To avoid the multicollinearity between Tˆ
and Mˆ when jointly used, we instrument M with M˜ and T with Tˆ .7 The absence of such
multicollinearity is essential to disentangle the effect of labour from goods market integration.
Financial Openness. (6) and (7) additionally control for financial openness. This undoes the
statistical significance of the immigration effect, but preserves its positive sign. A similar effect
is produced by the direct inclusion among the regressors of the great circle distance, strongly
correlated with Rose and Spiegel’s indicator (ρ = 0.6059). Interestingly, the positive effect of
trade openness remains.
Geography and Institutions. (1) to (7) draw on the largest possible sample, while (8) to
(11) use a smaller sample for which institutional quality data is available. These 63 countries
7An F-test on the first stage (regressing T on Tˆ and Mˆ), reveals both instruments are jointly but not individ-
ually significant. In this case, weakness of instruments cannot be rejected. Multicollinearity persists even if (2) is
not identically specified for Mij and Tij .
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tend to be richer, and presumably, have better data quality. Specifications (8) and (9) control
for a direct effect of geography - see Sachs (2003) - extending (6) and (7) with the inclusion of a
malaria index. Adding institutional controls (coefficients not displayed) in (10) and (11) leaves
the coefficients on immigration, trade and financial integration fairly unchanged. The IV and
OLS estimates are considerably close. Finally, the inclusion of ethnic fragmentation (Alesina et
al., 2003) leaves estimates qualitatively unchanged (not reported).
4 Summary
Using geography-based instruments and controlling for the sheer population size effect, we find
robust evidence for immigration to be non-negatively causally related to per capita income.
Hence, immigration gives rise to a gain that can – in principle – be used to make the native
population better off without excluding the immigrants from the redistribution scheme.
Our preferred specification – columns (10) and (11) in Table 1 – imply that a 10% increase
in the migrant stock leads to a per capita income gain of 2.2%. We also find that trade and
financial integration positively affect per capita income.
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A Data Sources
- Population, GDP per capita (2000 PPP USD)(yi): World Development Indicators 2007.
- Bilateral migration stocks (Mij): World Bank, Development Research Centre on Migra-
tion, Globalisation and Poverty. 8
- Bilateral trade data (Tij = (Xij +Xji) /Yi): Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF, Sept. 2006
CD-ROM.
- Trade openness (Ti): Penn World Tables 6.2.
- Adjacency (ADJij), Area, bilateral distance: CEPII, Paris.9
- Financial Openness (Fi) proxy: negative of Rose (2008).
- Constitutional Review (Ii) : La Porta et al. (2004).
- Landlockedness: CIA World Factbook 2008.
- Malaria Index: Rodrick et al. (2004).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS IV IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Migration (M) 0.261*** 0.810*** 0.535*** 0.240*** 0.484** 0.210*** 0.0998 0.231*** 0.226** 0.232*** 0.221**
(0.0462) (0.153) (0.138) (0.0434) (0.228) (0.0426) (0.133) (0.0539) (0.0897) (0.0531) (0.0875)
Trade (T) 0.00565*** 0.0191*** 0.00358*** 0.0151** 0.00109 0.00457 0.00104 0.00456
(0.00191) (0.00724) (0.00125) (0.00656) (0.00125) (0.00301) (0.00126) (0.00295)
Finance (F) 0.723*** 0.582*** 0.426*** 0.415*** 0.431*** 0.420***
(0.0965) (0.159) (0.0948) (0.0981) (0.1000) (0.101)
Market Size yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Geography yes yes yes yes
Institution yes yes
Adj R2 / Wald Chi 0.343 66.20 79.10 0.387 68.09 0.542 161.7 0.774 475.7 0.773 488.2
MES 27.86 18.03 5,506 6,351 7,066 6,921
Variable instrumented: M for (2) M for (3) M for (5) T for (5) M for (7) T for (7) M (for 9) T for (9) M for (11) T for (11)
1.500*** -2.881*** -1.763** 55.62 -2.242** 57.75* -2.923** 131.6*** -2.937** 132.0***
(0.279) (0.710) (0.861) (39.61) (0.921) (32.90) (1.302) (48.61) (1.334) (49.43)
0.0254*** 1.441** 0.0416*** 1.369* 0.0429** 2.559** 0.0431** 2.553**
(0.00855) (0.584) (0.0145) (0.811) (0.0200) (1.136) (0.0205) (1.147)
Finance (F) -0.609** 2,708 -0.947*** -13.39 -0.957*** -13.11
(0.243) (11.83) (0.287) (16.73) (0.291) (17.17)
Adj R2 0.556 0.531 0.549 0.375 0.565 0.372 0.311 0.521 0.300 0.512
F-stat. on Excl. Instruments 28.82 16.49 15.94 3,996 12.73 1,658 8,882 3,687 8,345 3,596
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1,5,10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant (not shown). Critical values for Minimum Eigenvalue Statistic (MES) are 7.03 (5), 4.58 (10), 3.95 (20), 3.63 (30). 
Table 1. Per capita income and immigration
(A) Second-stage regressions
Large sample (N=162)
Market Size Controls: ln Area, ln Population 1960, Landlockedness.  Geography Controls: Malaria Index. Institutional Controls: Constitutional Review. All first stage regressions include all exogeneous regressors (not shown). 
(B) First-stage regressions
Small sample (N=63)
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